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'The Power of Oongress to regulate Conmerce between
the States.
by
Andrew Strong White.

CHAPTER I:.

The History of the commerce clause in the United States
constitution.

C0iAP TER II.
Its interpretation and construction.

CHAPTER III.

The Police oower of the separate States.

THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO
REGULATE C0M.'ERCE BETV7EEn THE STATES.

CHAPTER I.

The History of the Commerce Clause in the United States
Constitution.

Sec. 8, Sub. 3 of the U. S. constitution provides as
follows;

"The congress shall have power, to regulate

commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
states, and with the Indian tribes."

To obtain a

thorough understanding of this important clause of
the constitution it is imperative that we review its
history, in order to determine how it cane about that
States peopled with inhabitants so jealous of their
liberty, so averse to centralization of power, could
have delegated this powerful prerogative to a general
government.
cessity-

We will find the reason to be urgent ne-
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We note in the early history of the American colonies the unjust and tyrannical treatment of England.
The growth of the spirit of retaliation and the steps
that were taken toward

During this

independence.

early period the colonies were governed
of Great Britain or by Parliament.

by the Crown

The representation

of New England in the administration of her own affairs
was indirect and insufficient-

The tendency to

form a separate union freed from monarchical oppression
is illustrated by the New England Confederacy of 1643,
the Temporary Congress of 1690,

the Convention of 1754

and the Stamp Act Congress of 1765.

Upon the out-

break of hostilities between the two countries in 1774,
a provisional central government was established known
as the Continental Congress.

This government was

revolutionary in its nature.

The union formed under

it was accepted by the people and the exercise of some
undefined general powers were delegated to it.

It was

given the right to declare war, to conclude peace, to
form alliances, and to contract debts on the credit of
the Union.

As the Congress commanded no credit either

at home or abroad its provisions could rarely be put into effect.

A government of this nature, bound by such

3
restrictions could not answer long the needs of a growing nation.

The prospect of a great war with England

emphasized the necessity for more efficient governmental machinery.

It did not have the lbility to enforce

its laws and practically was no more than an advisory
e
Its importance became so manifest that it was
board.
finally discarded.
A new government was formed under the Articles of
Confederation and Perpetual Union in the year 1777.
This instrument declared that;

"each State retains its

sovereignty, freedom, and independence and every power,
jurisdiction and right which is not by this Donfederation expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled-"

It was a league of friendship for

their common defense and for the promotion of liberty.
Although it was stronger and more efficient than the government it supplanted

it was slow and inadequate for

the purpose intended.

It might make laws but it

Could not enforce them without the consent of the States
This necessitated a prolonged discussion of every fundamental step,, gave room for jealousies and bred estrangement between the different sections of the country.
Up to this time no powers for the regulation of com-
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merce, external or internal had been surrendered by the
States except in the most general wayof the Articles provides that;

Act 6, Sec. 3

"no State shall lay any

imposts or duties, which may interfere with any stipulations in treaties entered into by the United States
in Congress assembled, with any king, prince, or State
in pursuance of any treaties already proposed by Congress to the courts of France and Spain."

Act 9, pro-

"the United States in Congress assembled

vides that;

shall have sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war, except in the cases of the
6th Article;

6f sending and receiving ambassadors;

tering into treatiesand alliances;

en-

provided, that no

treaty of commerce shall be made whereby the legislative power of the respective States shall be restrained
from imposing such imposts and duties on foreigners, as
their own people are subjected to, or from prohibiting
the exportation or importation of any species of goods
or commodities whatsoever."

Prom this we see that the

separate Statesrretained the right to impose duties on
imports.

Although far from perfect this constitution

existed through the long struggle for independence.

It

was more stable and more advanced than those which had
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preceded it.

It contained more elements of sovereignty.

The chief significance of it was that it served as a
stepping stone to something better.

It illustrates the

drift of popular thought towards the establislnent of
that last great plan of government for American freedom
and independence, the present United States constitution.
The Articles of Confederation failed on account of
their own weakness, their inability to enforce obedience, to raise money, and to maintain respect abroad.
They were also defective because they provided no uniform
laws to regulate commerce with foreign nations and
among the several States.

Each State passed its

own rules and provisions.

The result was that a few

of the States which had the advantage of fine harbors
prospered at the expense of those which were dependent
upon them and this led to jealousies and rivalries which
threatened a speed disruption of American peace and
comfort.

We can find no more elaborate dissertations

on these subjects than those presented by Hamilton,
Jay, and Majison in various numbers of the Federalist..
It was largely through the influence of their pens that
our present constitution was made possible in 1789.

because they
Not that they originated anything but
out of
educated the people up to it by arguing them
governtheir innate prejudices against a strong central
ment.
By our federal constitution the power to regulate
commerce with foreign nations and between the States is
delegated to Congress.

Perhaps the most important

cause leading to the adoption of the constitution of
the United States was the system of taxation and discrimination practiced prior to its adoption.

"It was

intended" said the learned Judge in Cook v State of
Pa. 97 U. S. 566 in his allusion to the power conferred
upon Congress to regulate Commserce, "to guard against
any taxation by the States which would interfere with
the freest interchange of commodities among the people
of the different states" or, as was suggested by Mr.
Madison in 1781, "it was indisperA~bly necessary that
the United States, in Congress assembled should be

,

vested with the right of superintending the commercial
relations of every State, that none might take place
which would be contrary to the general interests."
intention to remove the discriminations which existed
under the Confederation further appears by Sec. 9 of

The
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Article I. of the Constitution which provides that;
"No tax or duty shall be laid on any articles exported from any State.
by an

No preference shall be given

regulation of commerce, or revenue to the ports

of one State over those of another, nor shall vessels
bound to or from one State be obliged to enter, clear
or pay duties in another."
A striking example of this same evil, and its cure,
in another nation is to be seen in the recent history
of the states now composing the German Empire.

In its

early history it was ccomposed of separate states which
though lying contiguously to each other, peopled by
the same race, and speaking the German language, were
distinct and separate municipalities,
system of duties and taxation.

each with its own

Upon the frontiers of

these states the custom officials were posted to collect a duty on all articles of commerce.

This system

became so burdensome on travellers and merchants and
was the source of so much discontent that it led to a
commercial union called the German Zollverein.

It is

a significant fact that the German empire united commercially before it did politically.
The Austtian emire was relieved from a similar situation by Joseph II. and it is quite an interesting and
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important truth that all nations have gradually swept
away these barriers to the progress of freer national
and inter-national commercial relations.
The commercial clause in the United States Constitution was not ah original conception but merely the
embodiment of a most advanced theory for the regulation of commerce.

CHAPTER II.
The Interpretation and Construction of the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution.
It is impossible to define the limits of Congressional po7wer over commerce for the reason that its scope
is being constantly widened with the advance of civilization and commercial methods.
The pDovisiors-of the constitution which serve as
land marks to the constitutional lawyer in interpreting
its meaning are as follows.
Art. I. S. 8, Sub. 3.
That Congress shall have power, "to regulate commerce
with foreign nations, and among the several states,
and with the Indian tribes."
Art. I. S. 10, Sub. 2.
That no State shall without the consent of Congress
"lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except
what may be absolutely necessary for executing its
inspectinn laws."
Art. I. S. 9, Sub. 5.
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"No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported
from any state.

No preference shall be given by any

regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one
State over those of another;

nor shall vessels bound

to or from one State be obliged to enter, clear or pay
duties in another."
Judge Cooley in his Principles of Constitutional Law
says;

j'the word commerce is not limited to traffic;

to buying and selling and exchange of commodities;

b~t

it comprehends nwvigation also, and all that is included
in commercial intercourse between nations and ports of
nations in all its branches and is regulated by prescrit
ing rules for carrying on that intercourse."

Wherever

therefore, navigation is not entirely confined to one
state it comes under the power of Congress.

Although

it is easy to establish this general proposition it is
most difficult to draw a well defined line between the
conflicting interests of State and nation.

Since the

late decision of the U. S. Supreme Court in the case of
the "State of Maine v. the Grand Trunk R. R. of Canada"
we are given reason to doubt that there are any settld
limits beyond which the States may not go.

Prior to

this decision it was supposed to be well settled that a
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COMState could not tax the receipts of inter-state
case is
merce but the conclusion to be drawn from this
that it can.

The great weight of authority has been

against such a view.

In the case of the Philadelphia

and Southern Mail S. S. Co- v. The Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania it was held that;

"The imposition of a

tax by the State of Pennsylvaniaupon a steamship company incorporated under the laws of Pennsylvania, upon
the gross receipts of such company, derived from the
transportation of persons and property by sea between
different States, and to and from foreign countries,
is a regulation of inter-state and foreign commerce, in
conflict with the exclusive power of Congress under the
constitutdon of the United States."

These cases serve

to illustrate the conflict of holdings and show the
unsettled condition of the law.
The flexibility of the Federal constitution has never
been so well exemplified as by its commerce clause.
Invention has changed the method of business, introduced new principles, and created ne- occupations.
progress of science has revolutionized business.

The
Com-

mercial and industrial affairs are constantly changing
and improving.

With this growth our law has developed.

The provisions of the Constitution are applied to prin-
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ciples never dreamed of by its makers.

It was forty

years after the adoption of the Constitution before a
steamboat was successfully used to take part in the actual transportation of goods and the navigation of the
waters of the country.

The railroad, the steamboat,

the telegraph, are modern inventions that have raised
important questions for our courts to decideIn interpreting and construing the constitution we
find a labyrinth of conflicting decisions and dicta as
regards the relations existing between the general government and the separate States in reference to the
power to regulate commerce.

To put each in its proper

sphere is a difficult task.

The exclusive jurisdiction

of Congress over subjects of inter-state commerce has
not been judiciously recognized until a recent period.
Prior to 1886 by an almost unanimous concurrence of decisions the States were permitted to exercise in certain
cases control over inter-state commerce.

Since the

passage of the Inter-State Commerce Act this has been
somewhat modified.

In the case of Munn v- the State

of Illinois 94 U. S. 113, the judge said;

"It is not

everything which effects commerce, which amounts to a
regulation of it within the meaning of the constitution.
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concern and
The regulation of elevators is of domestic
until congress acts directly in reference to interstate relations the State may exercise all acts of government over them," although it was conceded that inter,tate commerce was effected by such regulation, and also
in the case of the Chi- B. & Q,. R. R. v. the State of
Iowa 94 U. S. 155, the court said ;

"A State may pass

such rules as are necessary to promote the welfare of
its citizens within its own jurisdiction even though
those without the State may be indirectly effected."
As early as 1829 the same general principle was held in
Wilson v- Blackbird Creek Marsh Co. 2 Peters 245, and
as late as 1882 in Transportation Co v. Petersburg 107
U. S. 691, where it was held that;

"T1harfage charges

were subject to local State laws and that until Congress
has acted the U. S. could not act through its courts
upon the subject."
The States have seldom if

ever claimed the right to

interfere directly with inter-state commerce.
in 15 Wallace 232,

In 1870

an act of the Pennsylvania legisla-

ture was held void which levied a tax upon all freight
carried through the State by any railroad and in Hall v.
De Cuir 95 U. S. 485, the courts said;

"It is hard to
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draw the line which separates the powers of the States
from the exclusive powers of Congress but we may safely
say that a State which seeks to impose a direct burden upon inter-state commerce or to interfere directly
with its freedom does encroach on the exclusive power
of Congress."

In Gibbons v. Ogden 9 Wheaton 1, it

was held that;

"A State law giving Livihgstone and

Fulton the exclusive right to navigate New York waters
with steam was held unconstitutional as a direct interference with commerce.

In 107 U. S. 678 a regulation

of the times of opening and closing bridges was considered within the jurisdiction of the State as only indirectly effecting commerce.

In the case of the

Pensacola Tel. Co. v- Vestern etc. Tel Co. 96 U. S. 1
the court held;

"That it is not only the right but the

duty of Congress to see to it that intercourse among
the States and the transmission of intelligence are not
obstructed or unnecessarily encumbered by State legislation."

By a comparison of these cases one may ob-

serve that to constitute commerce between the States it
is essential that it be not confined to one state exclusively but concern more than ,ne.
says;

Judge Cooley aptly

"The conuerce of a State which congress may con-
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a

trol must be in
torial".
that;

some stage of its

In Veazie

progress

v.-.Moor 14 H1un.

568

extra-terriit

is

held

"Because the products of domestic enterprise in

agriculture or manufactures or in the art4 may ultimately become the subjects of cormerce outside the State,
it cannot be properly concluded, that the control of
the means or the encroachments by which enterporise is
fostered and -orotected is imolied ih this important
And again in U. S. v DeWitt 9 Wall.

grant of power."
41 the court said;

"To a law of congress which under-

takes to regulate the sale of an article within a State,
and to impose penalties for preparing, offering for
sale, or selling it except after it has been subjected
to a prescribed test as a protection against explosions,
is inoperative within State limits."

The principle

that congress has only such powers as are delegated to
it by the constitution is well illustrated in the last
-ase

cited.

Where Congress has jurisdiction it is

exclusive and although it may never have legislated on
the subject it is an encroachment on its domain and
void for a State to do so.

It was so held in Welton

v Missouri £ U. S. 275 Judge Cooley says;
Congress is

"Inaction by

equivalent to a declaration that ;1he comerce
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and untraineled."
under its control shall remain free
this subject
By careful sifting of the cases on
propositions
we are ena-ble to lay down a few general
of the conwhich are useful in the study of this part
stitution.
Firstly, it is a fundamental deduction from the authorities that the States cannot pass regulations effecting the navigation of public waters, the case of
Gibbons v Ogden 9 aheaton 1 before referred to is authority for this statement, also the case of Mann v
New Orleans 112 U. S. 69 in which it was held that;
Astatute of Louisiana imposing a license tax, not on
the vessel as property, but on the business of owning
and operating tow-boats between New Orleans and the
Gulf of Mexico, is invalid, as it puts a price on the
privilege of navigating the Mississippi."

The

law is in some cases clear and evidently well settled
but many fine distinctions still exist.

A good illus-

tration of this is that while Congress takes upon
itself the duty of maintaining harbors and rivers in navigable~condition, also the building of light-houses and
piers, it leaves to the States the regulation of their own
pilot and quarantine laws.
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property
Secondly, in regard to the importation of
It is without doubt

from another State or country.

settled law that a State cannot tax nor require an
importer to take out a license to carry on his business,
as such a tax or license would necessarily be a restraint
on inter-state commerce and consequently void.

Such

was the holding in Brown v Maryland, 12 Wheaton 419.
In the case of Waring v the Mayor 8 Wall 110 it was held
"That imported articles may be taxed after they have
passed from the hands of the importer even when they remain in the original package.

There is a conflict of

authority on this point it having been frequently hekd
that an.imported article continues an article of commerce so long as it remains in the original package.
The law on this point was however definitely settled
by 26 Statutes at Large 313 which provides that;

"All

liquors transported into another State, or remaining t
therein for use should, upon arrival in the State, be
subject to its laws as though produced there, and should
not be exempt therefrom by reason of being introduced
therein in the original package."
Thirdly, as to the regulations affecting the bringing
into a State -of persons. from another State or country.
It has been held on several occasions by the U. S.
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Supreme court that, a State law requiring a tax to be
imposed on each immigrant landing and seeking admittance
at its port of entry was unconstitutional.

In the cel-

ebrated Passenger Cases 7 How. 283 the court held thati
"A law of N. Y. State requiring every master of a vessel
bringing passengersfrom other countries, and landing
them within its limits, to pay to the State a certain
sum per head fer every such passenger was a usurpation
of federal power and consequently unconstitutional and
void," and in Henderson v Mayor 92 U. S. 259 it was held
that;

"An act which imposed a burdensome condition on

the shipmaster with an alternative payment of a small
sum of money, for each passenger landed, was held Void
as being a tax on the shipowner for the right to land
the passenger, and in effect a tax on the passenger
himself."
Fourthly, as to laws affectihg the exportation of
property to another State or country-

It seems to be

well settled that a State cannot impose a tax on the
mere act of exportation.

In the case of Almy v Califor-

nia 24 How. 169 a stamp duty imposed on all bills of
lading of goods sent out of the State was held invalid :
as a direct interference

with inter-state and foreign
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commerce.

In State v.

Indiana and Ohio Gas Co. 120

Md. 575 the courts said that;

"A State cannot forbid

the conduct from it in pipes of natural gas."

It has

however on various occasions been absurdly claimed that

ar :

goods produced in a State prepared for shipment out of
the State should be

exempt from taxation.

This prop-

osition has never received any judicial sanction.
Coe v-

In

Enol 116 U. S. 517 the court maintained that;

"The main fact that property produced in the State is
ready for shipment and that the owner intends to ship it,
will not exempt it from State taxation,

"

and where the

manufacture of an article is forbidden by law as in the
case of oleomargarine or liquor it can't be made or distilled solely because it is intended for export.
was so held in Kidd

v

It

Pearson 128 U. S. 1

Fifthly, as to regulations of the business of carrying property and persons in the prosecution of foreign
and inter-state commerce.
There is no controversy over the question of interstate commerce.

The regulation of it is left exclusively

to the separate States.

They have however no jurisdic-
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tion over inter-state commerce except such as is necessary
to enforcetheir police regulations.

Congress has gen-

eral power over all commerce which involves the interests
of more than one State.

In the case of State Freight

Tax 15 Wall 232 a statute of Pennsylvania imposing a
tax to be paid by railroads upon freight taken up within
the State and carried out of it,azd taken up without the
State and brought within it was held void.

That a State

could not tax the gross receipts of inter-state commerce
was considered law prior to the "Maine," case.

It is

however obvious that the conclusion to be drawn from the
reasoning in this case is that it can.

It might be

claimed that the "Maine" case was foreshadowed by the
holding Ln Pullman Palace Car Co.

v- Pa. 11 Sup. Ct.

Reports 876 but I think there is a clear distinction.
In the latter case a statute of Pennsylvania imposed a
tax, on the capital stock of every railroad and car company in the proportion which the number of miles operated
by it within the State bore to the whole number operated
by it every where,.was upheld as to the non-resident
Pullman Car Company, "because it had within the State
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constantly engaged in its business, though mainly operated in inter-state journeys, a certain number of its
cars, which thus acquired a situs there foi taxation, the
tax being in reality upon the cars as property".

This

holding is by no means unchallenged but the drift of
judicial opinion seems to be in its direction.
was divided upon the question.

The court

The prevailing opinion

distinguished this tax from an occupation or license tax,
or a tax on the right of transit, and extended the doctrine to the a. U. Tel. Co.

v. Mass. 125 U. S. 530,

when a like tax on fixed property was sustained.
To sum uw the situation we find that Congress has
power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and between the States.

There is no concurrent jurisdiction

between Congress and the States but the States are allowed to pass such police regulations as they deem necessary
and
to protect the health, comfort welfare of their citizens.
In the discussion of this subject I have followed large
ly a classification suggested by Judge Cooley as it is
the clearest presentation of the great mass of authority
touching directly or indirectly upon this important sub-
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ject.

.he illustrative cases have been chosen with care

and selected as the clearest embodiment of the principles
laid

down.

CHAPT7:

111.

The Police power of the States.

The United States constitutional limitation upon
the power of a State to legislate over its
is

found in,

Aendment

z.JV Sec.

1.

own affairs

which reads as follows:

" nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law,
deny to any person within its
protection of the laws."
ple of justice.

nor

jurisdiction the equal

This is a fundamental princi-

It was acknowledged by King John of

a-igland in the Magna Charta.

In 1789 when the States

were asked to ratify the proposed constitution of the
United States, as drawn up at Philadelphia, they imposed
the condition that they should be guaranteed certain
rights.

This was granted and upon the adoption of the

constitution Congress passed the first ten amendments
in substance a ]ill of 1lights.

ith this assurance, for

the security of their liberties, the States ratified the
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constitution and by so doing beca,.e parts of one sovereign nation.

The fifth of these amendments read;

"no persons shall be deprived of life, liberty, and pro-per*y

without due process of law."

Under the constitution of the United States the separate States retained only such elements of sovereignty
as they had not delegated to Congress and within their
proper sphere were left to legislate for their own
welfare and happiness.

The Federal government is one

of delegated authority its scope is definitely defined,
and it cannot act except within its prescribed sphere.
The power of the different States to legislate for their
own health and prosperity is commonly known as the Police
power.

Blackstone defines it to be;

"The due regulation

and domestic order of the kingdom, whereby the inhabitants
of a State like members of a well governed 'family,

are

bound to conform their general behavior to the rules of
propriety,
decent,

goo,- neidhborhood and good manners,

and to be

industrious and inoffensive in their respective

stations."
To coizpre-enL. the discussion of t;ais subject an ex-
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planation is necessary of the meaning of the constitutional guaranty that;

"No State shall deprive its citi-

zens of life, liberty or prosperity without due process
of law,"

I can find no fitter words of explanation than

those used by the court in the case of Bertholf v O'Reilly
74 1. Y. 509 where it was aptly said;

"The main guaran-

ty of private rights against Unjust legislation is found
in that momorable

clause in the Bill of 11ights, that,

no man shall be depr-ved of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.

This guaranty is not con-

strued in any narrow or technical sense.

The right to

life may be invaded without its destruction.

One may

be deprived of his liberty, in a constitutional sense,
without putting his person in confinement.

Property

may be taken without manual interference therewith or its
-1hyS ical destruction,

The right to life includes the

right of the individual to his body in its completeness
and without its dismemberment, the right to liberty, the
right to exercise his faculties and to follow a lawful

avocation for the support of life, the right of property,
the right to acquire property and enjoy it in any ,.ay con-

4istent

..ith

he equal viihts o: o'

es

anL the just

exactions and demands of the State.i
B

"due process of law" is

shall be deprived of life,
out a fair

trial.

meant that no person

liberty or property with-

The term is

synonymous with "law

of the land." which means according to fundamental principles of justice.
27 Vt.

In Thorpe v Rutland, etc., R. i.

150 the court said;

"The police power of the

State extends to the protection of the lives, 13lmbs,
health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and the protection of all property within the State."

These laws

are passed by the legislature of the State and if they
are adapted to protect the peace, health and good order
of the people the ju7icial department cannot interfere.
It was held in the important Slaughter House Cases,
6 Jallace 36 that, "a State law granting to a State
corporation the exclusive right for a term of years to
control the slaughtering of cattle in and near to one of
its cities, and requiring that all cattle and other
animals intended for sale or slau- lter

in

that -istrict

shall be brought to the yards and slaughter houses of

27
the corporation to
the corporation, and authorizing
the use of wharves
exact certain prescribed fees for
may be
and for each animal landed or slaughtered,
maintained as a State regulation of police."
The regulation of the sale of intoxicating liquors also belongs to the States, but a State cannot prohibit the importation of liquor nor its sale in the
original package, for it is then an article of commerce and under the control of Congress.

The prin-

ciples have been repeatedly laid down by the U. S.
Supreme Court.

It was held in the License Cases 5

How. 504 and in Ifugler v Kansas 123 U. S. 623.

They

remain in so far as they have not been superceded by
statute.
The prohibition and the manufacture of oleomargarine
in imitation of butter has been held constitutional in
along list of cases.

In Powell v Pennsylvania 127

U. S. 678 a statute of the State of Pennsylvania

for-

bidding the manufacture and sale any substitute for
butter was held constitutional and the court declared
that it was not in its province to declare the act
unconstitutional but that the remedy of the oppressed
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was at the polls and through the legislature.

The

grounds for these decisions were that liquor and oleomargarine being detrimental to the health and good
morals of its citizens the States could constitutionally
prohibit their use by the exercise of their police power.
The States may regulate the transportation of petroleum, natural gas, and high explosives through their
territory.
Immigrants suspected of having contagious diseases
may be detained, inspected and dealt with as necessity
requires.

in the case of R. R. Co. v Husen 95 U. S.

465 the court held that;

"Clhile we unhesitatingly ad-

mit that a State may pass sanitary laws and laws for
the protection of life, libertyrproperty or health
within its borders, while it may prevent persons and
animals suffering under contagious and infectious
diseases, or convicts, etc. from entering the State
and while for the purpose of self-preservation it may
establish quarantine and reasonable inspection laws, it
may not interfere with transportation into or through
the State beyond what is absolutely necessary for selfprotection.

It may not, under cover of exerting its po-
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lice power, substantially prohibit or burden either foreign or intoe-state commerce.

The police power of a

state cannot obstruct foreign conherce beyond the necessity of its exei-ise and under color of it, objects
not within its scope cannot be secured at the expense
t
of the protection afforded by the Federal constitution."

The regulation of the pilot and harbor laws is left to
the :]tates although Congress has concurrent jurisu-ction.

1n iJprague v Thompson 118 U. 5. 90 the court held

that,

"The regulations must not discriminate between ves-

sels from different States."

It was also held con-

stitutional fox- the State of Alabama to pass a law requiring that all locomotive engineers be examined for
color blindness in Smith v Alabama 124 U. S. 465.
The State may also require of railroad corporations that
they maintain gates or flagmen at crossings to protect
the lives of its citizens.

Cattle guards may also be

required.
WJhile it is true that the waters of a State that form
a part of the highways of inter-state and foreign commerce are under the control of uongress the

tates at all

times have the right to improve those which are entirely
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within their borders, and to establish ferries across
them, and to make ferry companies take out licenses from
the States for the privilege.
Louis 107 U. S. 365.

Ferry Company v East St

In some case,,.noteworthy among

which is Gilman v Phil. 3 Wall 713 the States have been
allowed to interfere to some extent with commerce.
the case sighted above the court held that;

In

"A State un-

der the protection of federal law might ridge a navigable
stream even when it

was to some extent an impediment to

commerce."
A State has the right to impose such duty on imports
and exports from and to foreign counti-ies as are necessary
t.o execute its

United States Con-

Art. 1. S. 10. Cl.v.

stitution.
In

inspection laws.

1885 the Supreme court of the United States said,

in

Gloucester Ferry

U.

S.

196,

jo. v The State of Pennsylvania 114

"As to those subjects of commerce which are

local or limited in their nature or sphere of action, the
State may prescribe regulations until Congress assumes control of them;

as to such as are national in their char-

acter and require uniformity of regulation the power of
Congress is exclusive and until Congress acts such corn-
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merce is entitled to be free from State exactions and
burdens.

"Up to 1886 we find from a review of the lead-

ing cases that in the absence of express regulations by
Congress inter-state commerce might be burdened to a large
extent if the burdensome laws but took the nature of police regulations.

This sort of thing has however been

largely checked since the passage of the Inter-state Commerce Act.

In the case of In re Barber 39 Fed. Reporter

64, a statute of M.1innesota which in the guise of a police
regulation required that all dressed meats offered for sale
in that State should be inspected alive twenty-four hours
before such sale was held unconstitutional as a us&pation
of federal power.
court held that;

In Mugler v Kansas 123 U. S. 623 the
"A State when providing'for the pro-

tection of the public health, the public morals for pblic safety is

subject to the paramount authority of the

constitution of the United States;

and may not violate

rights secure,_ or guaranteed by that instrument 0r3 interfere with the execution of power confided to the general
government."
.Ihile, on the one hand., a State must not use its police
power as an instrument of fraud the United States gov-
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errient must not, on the other, declare police laws of the
States unconstitutional simply because they may remotely
effect inter-state comnierce.

Congress, in its delegated

capacity, has absolutely exclusive power within its own
domain but this great powei must be used with justice and
not contrary to the absolute rights of the people.
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